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actions. 2 Both models maintain that compassion is made
possible by the ability of the one who feels compassion
(source) to identify with the plight of the individual for
whom compassion is felt (target).3 They diverge in their
analyses of how identification is achieved. One account,
advanced separately by Lawrence A. Blum and Adrian
M. S. Piper, contends that imaginative reconstruction
of the other's subjective experiences is necessary for
identification. 4 The alternative, which I develop, denies
that imagination is required for identification, but admits
that it can playa facilitating role. That the source has a
particular set of beliefs, including beliefs about the
target's vulnerability and its role in occasioning the
target's plight, as well as beliefs about the source's
similar vulnerability and consequent liability to
misfortune, can suffice for identification. 5
Examining compassion for nonhuman animals not
only reveals the limitations of the imagination-based
account; it also underscores some advantages of the
belief-based model. The weaknesses of the BlumJPiper
view are discussed in part II. The contention ofpart III is
that the original version of the belief-based model can
be amended to explain how human compassion for other
animals is possible, appropriate, and rational. Part IV
concludes by briefly sketching conditions under which
compassion is misnamed, misplaced, or irrational.
A preliminary comment. Both accounts presuppose
a cognitively complex conception of emotion, according
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My thesis is that it can be, and frequently is, rational
for humans to feel compassion for nonhuman animals.
Compassion for animals can be explained by examining
several modes of connection between humans and other
animals. The connections encompass modes of
identification between humans and other animals, for
example: imaginative reconstructions of their subjective
experiences, beliefs about humans and other animals,
including beliefs about similarities between species,
other emotions toward animals, such as kinship feelings,
and outlooks or ways of life that reflect value judgments
about and attitudes toward nonhuman animals. To feel
compassion for animals is to be connected with them
in an especially complex way. The challenge of this
essay is to comprehend this connection.
Two competing accounts of compassion have
emerged in recent philosophical literature. l Both rely
on a core definition of compassion as an intense
emotional response to the misfortune of another, which
includes suffering with the other, and concern for the
other's good. This concern is frequently expressed in
benevolent other-regarding thoughts, desires, and
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primarily by inference and extrapolation. The story is
familiar. We have inner, subjective experiences, and
behave in recognizable ways when we have them. We
observe the similar behavior of others and infer that
they have inner experiences similar to ours that correlate
with their observable behavior. When we know of
another's character, beliefs, and desires, we have a
firmer basis for making judgments about the quality of
his or her subjective experiences. In short, the better
our knowledge of the other, the more likely that our
imagination is a reliable guide to the quality of his or
her inner life.
This presents a difficulty for attempts by
imagination-based accounts to explain compassion
for animals. Our modes of access to the inner
experiences of nonhuman animals are more restricted
than our modes of access to the experiences of fellow
humans. Though some forms of animal behavior are
similar to human behavior, other differences between
species make unlikely consistently reliable inferences
from observations of similar behavior to the conclusion
of similar subjective experiences. Consequently, if
imaginative reconstructions of their subjective states
are based on these inferences, imagination is unlikely
to be a trustworthy indicator of the nature and quality
of their experiences.
Imaginative reconstructions give particularly
dubious clues to the inner experiences of animals whose
neurophysiology and observable behavior are quite
dissimilar from ours. Thomas Nagel goes to the heart
of this problem when he writes:

to which both belief and affect are essential components.
The conception's main features are:
1) At least some emotions are composites of beliefs
and feelings;
2) There are beliefs that characteristically accompany
each kind of emotion that distinguish it from every
other kind; and
3) Some of these beliefs are about the target of the
emotion. 6
Consequently, the physiological states experienced by
a person who feels emotion cannot be identified as a
particular emotion, for example, compassion, pity, or
anger, without reference to that person's beliefs.

n
Neither Blum nor Piper claims to explain compassion for nonhuman animals, but, instead, both restrict
their accounts to compassion between human persons.
This restriction is related to their belief that imaginative
identification with the other's condition is required
for compassion. Blum maintains that "failure of
imagination is typically not a purely intellectual or
cognitive failure; for it can itself be part of a more
general failure to regard the other as fully human, or to
take that humanity sufficiently seriously" and that "the
limits of a person's capacities for imaginative
reconstruction set limits on her capacity for
compassion."7 For Piper, compassion requires "an
application of modal imagination to a particular kind
of imaginative object, namely, a human subject, and to
a particular quality of that kind of object, namely, her
inner states."s That the source of compassion should
imagine what it would be like for himself or herself to
be in the other's condition is not, for the Blum/Piper
account, sufficient for identification. Instead, the source
must be able to imaginatively reconstruct the negative
experiences that the other is undergoing. This is
reasonable. Different people sometimes react differently
to similar circumstances. Since compassion includes
suffering with another and concern for the other's good,
it makes sense to require that the other's experiences
should be the basis of imaginative identification.
Our modes of epistemological access to the
experiences of others are, however, limited. We work
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Our own experience provides the basic material
for our imagination, whose range is therefore
limited.... I want to know what it is like for a
bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am
restricted to the resources ofmy own mind, and
those resources are inadequate to the task. I
cannot perform it either by imagining additions
to my present experience, or by imagining
segments gradually subtracted from it, or by
imagining some combination of additions,
subtractions, and modificationsY [Italics his.]
If imaginative reconstruction of another's subjective
experiences is required for compassion, and if our
abilities to imaginatively identify with the inner
experiences of animals are limited, then it is possible
to feel compassion for nonhuman animals on fewer
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(2) X must believe that X or someone close
to X is similar to Y in that X or someone
close to X and Y are both vulnerable;

occasions than we think. The possibility of compassion
on these occasions is premised on our ability to
imaginatively enter into the subjective experiences of
animals with reasonable accuracy. How might the
imagination-based view account for cases in which we
think we feel compassion for animals, yet cannot
imaginatively reconstruct their inner experiences? One
possibility is that we actually experience some other
closely related emotion, and have simply misnamed our
feeling. The imagination-based account should enable
us to identify and explain our error and, also, spur us on
to find more nuanced explanations of our emotions
toward animals. Another possibility involves departing
from the claim that compassion requires imagination.
When we lack a firm basis for imaginative identification,
yet think we feel compassion-for example, if we think
we feel compassion for a bat-our emotion is indeed
compassion, but is misplaced or irrational. The
appropriateness or rationality of compassion, but not its
possibility, would depend on our ability to imaginatively
identify with the animal's subjective experiences.
In part III, I argue for different conclusions. When
we think we feel compassion for other animals, this
usually is what we feel, even when imagination is an
unreliable guide to their subjective experiences. (The
imagination-based account does not include resources
for an "error theory" that could explain why we have
apparently mistaken other emotions for compassion.) In
addition, compassion for animals is, frequently, neither
misplaced nor irrational. Both claims can be substantiated
by relinquishing the imagination-based account and
turning to the belief-based model of compassion.

(3) X must believe that Y's vulnerability
played a part in occasioning Y's misfortune; and
(4) X must believe that Y's misfortune is
serious. lO
X's having these beliefs is not only sufficient for the
rationality of X's compassion for Y, it also allows X to
identify with Y's plight. These beliefs make X's
compassion for Y possible and rational. The rationality
of X's compassion does not depend on X's acknowledging in himself or herself the particular vulnerability
believed to occasion Y's misfortune. X need only make
the general judgment that he or she is vulnerable, as is
Y, and, consequently, can also experience misfortune. I I
Two challenges must be met if the belief-based
account is to provide a convincing alternative to
imagination-based attempts to explain compassion for
animals. More must be said about how identification
can be achieved. 12 Also, questions about justification
must be answered.
Bringing together two ideas helps to clarify
identification. One is the distinction between the act of
identifying and the content of identification. 13 The other
is the notion that identification is rarely an all-or-nothing
affair but, instead, a matter of degree. We are able to
identify with others in varying degrees. The different
degree of identifiability fall along a continuum, from
thinner to thicker. The richer the content, the thicker
our identification.
On the Blum/Piper analysis, imagination provides
both the act of identifying with the target of compassion
and the content of the identification. On the belief-based
account, the act of identifying is made possible by the
source's having the required beliefs. The beliefs
themselves give identification some content. Suppose
I believe that you are experiencing a misfortune, for
example, a bad presentation of a paper at a professional
conference, because of some particular vulnerability,
such as the tendency to go blank while speaking before
an audience. Since. I believe myself to be similarly
vulnerable and similarly liable to distress, these beliefs
could provide me with a basis for identifying with your
plight. Other sources, such as experience and

III

The imagination-based account leads us astray by
requiring imaginative identification for compassion.
Imagination is not the only way in which identification
can be achieved. Other modes of identification are
possible. Elsewhere I have claimed:

,

if X feels compassion for Y, X's having the
following set of true and/or justified beliefs is
sufficient for X's compassion for Y to be
rational:
(I) X must believe that X or someone close

to X is vulnerable and, because of this
vulnerability, is susceptible to misfortune;
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beings, describe our relationships with them, and locate
our place among other inhabitants in a shared universe.
This matrix can, but need not be, sufficiently inclusive
and well-developed to be considered a worldview. The
rational warrant of compassion as a response to the
misfortunes of nonhuman animals depends on the
rationality of its distinguishing beliefs. The warrant of
both,beliefs and, consequently, emotion, depends not
just on the extent to which these beliefs accurately
reflect the facts of human and animal biology but also
on the coherence of compassion and its characteristic
beliefs with a conceptual/evaluative framework. A
completejustification of compassion for animals should
locate the emotion's place within this framework.
This suggests direct and indirect justifications of
compassion. The former warrants the emotion by
identifying the beliefs characteristic of compassion that
furnish the basis of identification between source and
target and by justifying these beliefs by showing their
fit with facts. Indirect justification affords a different
warrant by assuring that compassion coheres with other
elements of an inclusive conceptual/evaluative
framework. Direct and indirect justifications are not
mutually exclusive. Direct is the primary mode of
warranting compassion, while indirect is a supplementary
form of justification.
An example illustrates direct justification. Suppose
a field biologist, studying a gorilla family in their natural
habitat, feels what she believes is compassion when a
family member dies. Does she feel compassion, or a
related emotion? If it is compassion, is it appropriate or
rational? To determine whether compassion is felt, we
must learn whether there is a basis for identification
between biologist and gorillas. Imaginative reconstruction of their subjective experiences could supply a
basis for identification. But if she identifies through
imagination, it is likely because she believes them
similar to her, including being similarly vulnerable to
experiencing the death of a loved one. However, if she
bas these beliefs, which are based on true and/orjustified
beliefs about similarities between gorilla and human
grief, not only can she compassionately identify with
their plight, but her emotion is also appropriate and
rational, since her beliefs about herself and them are
likely justified.
The biologist has expert knowledge that many
laypeople lack, and this might bias the example in favor
of the belief-based account. Consider another example.
Suppose a pet owner, lacking in specialized knowledge

imagination, can add content to my belief-based
identification. Benevolent other-regarding emotions and
attitudes, such as love, friendship, and kinship feelings,
can also strengthen our identification with another. They
manifest care and concern, and enable us to feel close
to others, thereby facilitating identification with those
for whom they're felt.
Along the thinner side of the spectrum is the degree
of identification needed to have compassion for a bat.
Since bats are so dissimilar from humans, the only
beliefs likely to make possible an act of identification
between source and target are about existential
vulnerabilities, that is, the kinds of vulnerabilities, such
as susceptibility to sickness and death, that can occasion
misfortune for all finite beings. 14 These beliefs could
be the only link between the human person and the bat.
In this case, the content of identification is thin indeed.
But it need not be so thin. Suppose the source of
compassion is a biologist who knows and loves bats.
The biologist's specialized knowledge and interest in
bats can add content to his or her belief-based
identification with the target of emotion.
The belief-based account also faces questions of
justification. Many similarities between humans,
including similar vulnerabilities, occasion what we
usually regard as misfortunes. Beliefs about human
weaknesses and their role in occasioning misfortune
are not especially hard to justify. Reliable judgments
do not require special knowledge or expertise. By
contrast, justifying our beliefs about animals can be
complicated, since it can require technical knowledge
that many people lack. Fewer similarities between
human and nonhuman animals than between humans,
and less accessible knowledge about actual similarities,
can lead to error. We might believe that animals are
similar to us when they're different. We could be
mistaken about their vulnerabilities, which might be
unlike ours. What would be a misfortune for us if we
were in their situation might not be unfortunate for them.
Lacking the appropriate knowledge of animal biology
and behavior, we might not be able to identify what
are, for them, true misfortunes.
The key to answering these concerns lies in the
realization that compassion for animals is one ofseveral
modes ofconnection between us and them. Compassion
and the beliefs about similar vulnerability and similar
liability to misfortune that distinguish it are frequeptly
components of a complete network ofemotions, values,
beliefs, attitudes, and actions that connect us with other
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I know that my compassion is appropriate or rational
without checking my beliefs about the animal's
condition against biological facts? Another way of
identifying with the bat's plight is given by emotions
directed toward a particular animal or generally felt for
nature or animals. Love, kinship feelings, and awe or
reverence bespeak an attitude of care and concern for
other beings. These emotions can forge connections
between the source and target of compassion, thereby
providing a stronger degree of identification than is
achieved only through beliefs. Consequently,
compassion is possible even for animals significantly
dissimilar from humans.
The appropriateness and rationality of compassion
are bolstered by its coherence with other beliefs,
emotions, values, and attitudes that connect the source
with other beings. The firmer the fit between
compassion and other elements of this larger conceptualJ
evaluative network, the more rational is compassion. A
qualification is needed to accommodate a case in which
the entire network, including compassion, is coherent
but fails to fit facts. Lacking contact with reality, even
a coherent set of beliefs, emotions, values, and attitudes
must be judged irrational.

of animal biology or behavior, feels what she believes
is compassion for her cat, whom she believes is ill. Does
she really feel compassion, and if so, is her feeling
appropriate or rational? Has she a basis for identifying
with her pet's plight? She might feel able to
imaginatively identify with its subjective experiences.
But what if imagination is unreliable? What if the actual
differences between her and her cat preclude reliable
inferences from the nature and quality of her own
subjective states to those of the animal? She might yet
be able to identify, if she has the appropriate set of true
and/or justified beliefs about herself and her cat. The
set would include the beliefs that the cat is weak or
vulnerable, that this vulnerability has occasioned some
misfortune that the animal experiences, and that she is
similar enough to the cat to be similarly vulnerable and,
consequently, liable to misfortune. These beliefs could
be justified on the basis of the owner's observations of
the cat's behavior and its similarities to hers when she
experiences distress and on subsequent inferences to
the fact that the cat, too, is in distress when displaying
similar behavior. However, this kind of inference can
be unreliable. It can be strengthened by corroboration
from more knowledgeable sources, such as information
from a veterinarian.
When an individual's beliefs about the target are
not well grounded in a knowledge of facts about
animals, indirect justification can supplement direct
justification of compassion. Suppose I feel what I
believe is compassion for an animal that is significantly
dissimilar from humans, such as a bat. Is this emotion
really compassion, and could it be rational or
appropriate? Is there a basis for identifying with the
animal? Imagination is not a likely means of reliable
identification, but, unless I have specialized knowledge,
neither are my beliefs about the similarities of bats and
humans, nor about the vulnerabilities and misfortunes
of bats. I might not know how to identify a bona fide
misfortune of a bat and, consequently, could falsely
believe the animal to be in distress, or fail to spot a true
calamity. Despite this potential for error, a bridge
between source and target can be laid by my having an
appropriate set of beliefs about our similarities with
respect to existential vulnerabilities and the misfortunes
they occasion. My compassion is warranted provided
that these beliefs are true and/or justified.
However, questions arise. Are beliefs about
existential vulnerabilities too general to provide a
sufficient basis for compassionate identification? Could
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IV

The previous remarks explain how compassion for
animals is possible, appropriate, and rational. To
conclude, we can sketch conditions under which
compassion is misnamed, misplaced, or irrational.
To misname compassion is to mistake a related
emotion for compassion. Both belief and affect are
components of emotion. Emotions are identified by
referring to distinguishing beliefs. The beliefs
characteristic of compassion permit identification
between source and target. Other modes of identification
are possible. Without the ability to identify with
another's plight, a person cannot be moved to
compassion, but might mistake for compassion another
emotion, such as pity or sympathy.
Compassion is misplaced or inappropriate when its
distinguishing beliefs about vulnerability and misfortune
are mistaken. Even when these beliefs are not mistaken,
compassion can be morally inappropriate. For example,
if we believe that Hitler and his followers were sane, it
would be morally inappropriate to feel compassion at
their demise. This is because we believe them responsible
for their deeds, think they ought to have known their
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actions were wrong, and judge they should have felt
remorse for their wrongdoing. Similar reasons can render
compassion for animals morally inappropriate for
members of species where there is evidence of cognitive,
emotional, and moral capabilities. 1S
Direct and indirect justification supply two distinct
criteria for assessing the rationality of compassion: fit
with facts and coherence. Though the rational warrant
of compassion is strengthened by coherence, direct
justification takes pride of place over indirect. Fit with
facts is the ultimate arbiter of the rationality of
compassion. Consequently, compassion is irrational if
the source persists in feeling it after being made aware
of mistaken beliefs about the target's experiences or if
the source lacks evidence of the target's misfortune,
even if compassion coheres with elements of a more
inclusive conceptual/evaluative scheme.
What about a case in which compassion for an
animal is rational, since it fits the facts, but fails to
cohere with other elements of a conceptual/evaluative
network? Suppose a speciesist, despite himself or
herself, feels compassion for a suffering animal. In this
case, the foregoing analysis has a hopeful implication.
If compassion for animals can be and frequently is
rational, this is a potentially valuable weapon in
arguments against speciesism, since the speciesist is not
free to dismiss compassion as merely irrational
sentimentality. To be sure, the speciesist could try to
revise the emotion to cohere with his or her other beliefs
and attitudes. But revision could proceed in the opposite
direction. We can hope that the force ofrational emotion
affords inroads where dispassionate reason alone fails
to effect morally constructive changes in outlook.
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